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Abstract—We study the physical-layer security of a multiple
source-destination (SD) pairs coexisting wireless network in the
face of an eavesdropper, where an eavesdropper intends to
wiretap the signal transmitted by the SD pairs. In order to protect
the wireless transmission against eavesdropping, we propose a
cooperation framework relying on two stages. Specifically, an
SD pair is selected to access the total allocated spectrum using
an appropriately designed scheme at the beginning of the first
stage. The other source nodes (SNs) simultaneously transmit
their data to the SN of the above-mentioned SD pair relying
on an orthogonal way during the first stage. Then, the SN of
the chosen SD pair transmits the data packets containing its
own messages and the other SNs’ messages to its dedicated
destination node (DN) in the second stage, which in turn will
forward all the other DNs’ data to the application center via
the core network. We conceive a specific SD pair selection
scheme, termed as the transmit antenna selection aided source-
destination pair selection (TAS-SDPS). We derive the secrecy
outage probability (SOP) expressions for the TAS-SDPS, as
well as for the conventional round-robin source-destination pair
selection (RSDPS) and non-cooperative (Non-coop) schemes for
comparison purposes. Furthermore, we carry out the secrecy
diversity gain analysis in the high main-to-eavesdropper ratio
(MER) region, showing that the TAS-SDPS scheme is capable
of achieving the maximum attainable secrecy diversity order.
Additionally, increasing the number of the transmission pairs will
reduce the SOP, whilst increasing the secrecy diversity order of
the TAS-SDPS scheme. It is shown that the SOP of the TAS-SDPS
scheme is better than that of RSDPS and Non-coop schemes.
We also demonstrate that the secrecy diversity gain of proposed
TAS-SDPS scheme is M times that of the RSDPS scheme in the
high-MER region, where M is the number of the SD pairs.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, source-destination pair
scheduling, secrecy outage probability, secrecy diversity gain.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE source-destination pairs can be allowed toperform wireless transmissions simultaneously with the
aid of spectrum sharing techniques [1]-[5], which are capable
of increasing the system’s efficiency and flexibility, whilst
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limiting interference imposed on each other. However, multi-
ple source-destination (SD) pairs coexisting wireless systems
may be vulnerable to both internal as well as to external
attackers, when they operate independently in non-cooperative
scenarios. For example, a hostile attacker may contaminate the
legitimate transmission, thus degrading the quality of service
(QoS). Furthermore, owing to the broadcast nature of radio
propagation, the confidential messages may be overheard by
malicious eavesdroppers. Hence, we have to protect wireless
transmissions of the multiple SD coexisting systems against
malicious eavesdropping.
Physical-layer security (PLS) [6]-[8] emerges as an effec-
tive method of guarding against wiretapping by exploiting
the physical characteristics of wireless channels. Single-input
multiple-output (SIMO) and multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) schemes were conceived in [9], [10] for reducing the
secrecy outage probability. Similarly, beamforming techniques
were also invoked for improving the secrecy of wireless
transmissions [11]-[12]. Moreover, the concept of cognitive
jamming was explored in [13], while specially designed arti-
ficial noise was used for preventing eavesdropping in [14].
Furthermore, the authors of [15] and [16] explored oppor-
tunistic user scheduling conceived with cooperative jamming.
More specifically, in [16], the non-scheduled users of the
proposed user scheduling scheme were invoked for generating
artificial noise in order to improve security in a multiuser
wiretap network. Both one-way [17], [18] and two-way [19],
[20] relaying schemes were conceived for guarding against
eavesdropping, demonstrating that relay selection schemes
are capable of improving the PLS. This is indeed expected,
because they improve the quality of the desired link.
As a further development, PLS has also been designed
for multi-system coexisting wireless networks, supporting a
multiplicity of diverse devices. Hence, more efforts should
be invested in enhancing the PLS of wireless networks. The
secrecy beamforming concept has been proposed by Lv et
al. [21] for improving the PLS of heterogeneous networks.
Moreover, jamming schemes have been investigated in [22]-
[24]. To be specific, in [22], the jammers were selected to
transmit jamming signals for contaminating the wiretapping
reception of the eavesdroppers. Meanwhile, the interfering
power imposed on the scheduled users was assumed to be
below a threshold. A comprehensive performance analysis
of artificial-noise aided secure multi-antenna transmission re-
lying on a stochastic geometry framework was provided in
[23] for K-tier heterogeneous cellar networks. In [24], joint
beamforming and artificial noise scheme were designed at
the secondary transmitters to guarantee secure wireless trans-
2mission. In [25], antenna selection was used for improving
the security of source-destination transmissions in a multiple
antenna aided MIMO system consisting of one source, one
destination and one eavesdropper. In [26], a joint guard zone
and threshold-based access control scheme was proposed for
the D2D users to maximize the achievable secrecy throughput.
Furthermore, the co-existence of a macro cell and a small
cell constituting a simple cellular network was investigated
by Zou [27]. Specifically, the overlay and underlay spectrum
sharing schemes have been invoked for a macro cell and a
small cell, respectively. Moreover, an interference-cancelation
scheme was proposed for mitigating the interference in the
underlay spectrum sharing case. In [28], Tolossa et al. inves-
tigated the base-station-user association scenarios suitable for
protecting the ongoing transmission between the base-station
and the intended user against eavesdropping. Additionally, the
achievable average secrecy rate was analyzed by exploiting the
association both with the “best” and with the kth best base-
stations.
Against this backdrop, in this paper, we explore the PLS of a
multiple SD pairs coexisting wireless network in the presence
of an eavesdropper. In contrast to [21]-[28], we investigate
the cooperation between different SD pairs for safeguarding
against malicious eavesdropping with the aid of a specifically
designed cooperative framework, and the main differences
between this paper and [21]-[28] are summarized in table I.
Moreover, we propose a pair of cooperation schemes based
on source-destination (SD) pair scheduling. More explicitly,
against this background, the main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows.
1) Firstly, we propose a cooperative framework relying on
two stages for protecting wireless transmissions against
eavesdropping, Specifically, in the first stage, an SD
pair will be chosen at the beginning of the transmission
slot. Then, other source nodes (SNs) will confidentially
transmit their data to the chosen SN via an orthogonal
way. In the second stage, the specifically chosen SN
transmits the repacked data to its destination node (DN),
which will forward the received packets to the application
center of the other SNs via the core network.
2) Secondly, we present a specific transmission selection
scheme, termed as the transmit antenna selection aided
source-destination pair scheduling (TAS-SDPS). To be
specific, in the TAS-SDPS scheme, the “best” antenna of
a chosen SD pair will be selected to transmit the repacked
data relying on the total shared spectrum.
3) Thirdly, we analyze the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
of the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme for transmission
between SD pair over Rayleigh fading channels, whilst
wireless transmission between SNs over Rician fading
channels. We also evaluate the SOP of the traditional
non-cooperative (Non-coop) and round-robin transmis-
sion pair scheduling (RSDPS) schemes for comparison.
Moreover, we evaluate the secrecy diversity gains of both
the TAS-SDPS and the RSDPS schemes, demonstrating
that the TAS-SDPS scheme is capable of achieving the
full secrecy diversity gain.
TABLE I
COMPARISONS BETWEEN OUR WORK AND THE RELATED [21]-[28].
Our [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28]
Cooperative framework X
Spectrum-sharing X X X X X
BS with multiple antennas X X X X X
User with multiple antennas X X X
TAS-SDPS scheme X
Secrecy outage probability X X
Secrecy diversity gain X X X
Jamming X X X X X
Secrecy rate X X X X
Zero secrecy capacity X X
Connection probability and se-
crecy probability
X X X
Against eavesdropping X X X X X X X
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Fig. 1. A multiple SD pairs coexisting wireless network in the presence of
an eavesdropper E.
4) Finally, it is shown that the SOP of the TAS-SDPS
scheme will be beneficially reduced by increasing the
number of SD transmission pairs. Furthermore, the TAS-
SDPS scheme outperforms the RSDPS and Non-coop
schemes in terms of both the SOP and the secrecy
diversity gain attained, demonstrating that the advantages
of the proposed cooperative framework improves the
security of wireless communications.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we
briefly characterize the PLS of a multiple SD pairs coexisting
wireless network. In Section III, we carry out the SOP analysis
of the Non-coop, RSDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes. In Section
IV we evaluate the secrecy diversity gain of the proposed
RSDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes. Our performance evaluations
are detailed in Section VI. Finally, in Section V we conclude
the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SD PAIRS SCHEDULING
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we considerM source-destination (SD)
pairs in the presence of an eavesdropper (E), where the E
intends to wiretap the wireless transmissions of the legitimate
source nodes (SNs) with the aid of a wide-band receiver.
Each SN is assumed to be equipped with two radio frequency
(RF) units, where one RF unit is used to perform wireless
transmissions between the SNs, and the other one is invoked
for communicating with the destination node (DN). For nota-
tional convenience, we let D represent the set of the SD pairs.
Moreover, both the SNs-DNs and SNs-E links are modeled by
Rayleigh fading [19], which are denoted by hsmidmj , hsmiel
and hskel , m, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, k 6= m, i ∈ {1, · · · , NT },
3j ∈ {1, · · · , NR}, l ∈ {1, · · · , NE}, respectively, where
NT , NR, and NE denote the number of antennas of the Sm
for communicating with the Dm, Dm, and E, respectively.
The expected values of |hsmidmj |
2, |hsmiel |
2 and |hskel |
2 are
σ2smidmj
, σ2smiel , and σ
2
skel
, respectively. For notational con-
venience, upon denoting σ2smidmj
= αsmidmj
σ2md, σ
2
smiel
=
αsmiel
σ2me, and σ
2
skel
= αskelσ
2
me, where σ
2
md and σ
2
me are
the respective reference channel gain of the SNs-DNs links and
SNs-E links. Furthermore, we assume that all SNs are located
in short range, and the links between SNs are characterized by
Rician fading [29], which are represented by (hsksm ,Ksksm),
where hsksm and Ksksm are the instantaneous channel gain
of Sk-Sm link and the Rician K-factor of the Sk-Sm link,
m, k ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, k 6= m. Additionally, we assume that
each SD pair can access an independent BHz spectrum.
The cooperative framework relies on two stages. To be
specific, at the beginning of the first stage, an SN will be
chosen, which is chosen according to the criterion of the
proposed TAS-SDPS scheme. Then, other SNs will simultane-
ously transmit their data to the appropriately selected SN using
orthogonal resources (e.g., time-division, frequency-division,
etc.). More specifically, if the chosen SN successfully decodes
an SN’s data, it will forward its data in the second stage.
Otherwise, the SN’s data will not be forwarded. Moreover, in
the second stage, the SN chosen will concurrently retransmit
its own data and along with the other SNs’s data to its DN
relying on orthogonal resources, where the DN will forward
the received data to the application center through the core
network.
B. Signal Model
In the first stage, let us assume that the SN Sm is selected
as the forwarding node. Then, other SNs will transmit their
signals to Sm on an orthogonal way with the aid of a single
antenna, and Sm receives all the rest SNs’s data simultane-
ously. Without loss of generality, the signal received at Sm
transmitted by Sk, k ∈ D− {m}, is given by:
ysksm =
√
Pshsksmxk + nsm , (1)
where Ps, xk , and nsm denotes the transmitted power of Sk,
the transmitted signal of sk, and the thermal noise received at
the Sm, respectively. In the meantime, the signal transmitted
by Sk will be overheard by E, which can be expressed as
yskel =
√
Pshskelxk + nel , (2)
where nel represents the thermal noise received at E.
From (1) and (2), the achievable rate of the Sk-Sm and
Sk-E links can be expressed as
Csksm =
B
2
log2(1 + γsksm) (3)
and
Cske =
B
2
log2
(
1 + γske
)
, (4)
respectively, where γsksm =
Ps
N0
|hsksm |
2
, γske =
NE∑
l=1
Ps|hskel |
2
N0
, N0 denotes the variance of the thermal noise
of Sm, Dm, and E, respectively.
In the second stage, Sm transmits the successfully decoded
data and its own data on an orthogonal way relying on NT
antennas. Thus, following [33], the signal of an SN received
at Dmj from Sm can be formulated as
ysmdmj =
NT∑
i=1
√
Ptxhsmidmjxs + ndmj , (5)
where Ptx and ndm denote the transmitted power of the Smi ,
and the thermal noise received at the Dmj , respectively. In
the space-time coding (STC) case, for simplicity, we assume
that the transmitted power of each antenna of Sm is equal,
thus, Ptx =
Pt
NT
, where Pt represents the available forwarding
power of the RF unit of the Sm. By contrast, we have Ptx = Pt
in the transmit antenna selection (TAS) case. Without loss
of generality, we assume that E[|xk|
2] = E[|xs|
2] = 1,
where E[·] denotes the operator of mathematical expectation.
Similarly to (3), the signal transmitted by Sm will be overheard
by El, which can be written as
ysmiel =
NT∑
i=1
√
Ptxhsmielxs + nel . (6)
Following [10] and [26], using (5) and maximal-ratio com-
bining (MRC) [33], for each SN, the achievable rate of the
Sm-Dm and of the Smi -Dm links in the STC and TAS cases
can be formulated as
Csmdm =
B
2
log2 (1 + γsmdm) (7)
and
Csmidm
=
B
2
log2
(
1 + γsmidm
)
, (8)
respectively, where γsmdm =
NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
Pt|hsmidmj
|2
NTN0
, γsmidm =
NR∑
j=1
Pt|hsmidmj
|2
N0
. It is pointed out that since the chosen SN
retransmits concurrently its own data and the successfully de-
coded SNs’s data relying on accessing the respective spectrum
allocated to each SN, the actually effective achievable rate for
each SD pair is given by (7) and (8), as Sm transmits a packet
consisting of all the data from the SNs.
Using (6) and MRC, for each SN, the achievable rate of the
Sm-E links can be expressed as
Csme =
B
2
log2
(
1 + γsme
)
, (9)
where γsme =
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
Pt|hsmiel |
2
NTN0
in the STC case, and γsme =
NE∑
l=1
Pt|hsmiel |
2
N0
in the TAS case.
Using (4) and (9), the overall capacity of the link spanning
from Sk, k ∈ D− {m}, the wiretap channel from Sm-E and
Sk-E can be obtained by using the maximum of the individual
achievable rate of these two links in the first and second stages,
4i.e.
C(k,m)se =max (Cske, Csme)=
B
2
log2
[
1 + max
(
γsme, γske
)]
.
(10)
As mentioned above, given the chosen transmission pair,
the signal of the chosen SN will only be transmitted during
the second stage. By contrast, the signal of other SNs will
be transmitted both during the first stage and be forwarded
in the second stage. Hence, the signal of the other SNs that
are being overheard in the two stages has been given in
(3) and (5), respectively. Noting that although only selection
combining (SC) is considered, here similar results can be
achieved with the aid of MRC. Moreover, as discussed in [17],
when independent and different codewords are used in the two
stages, MRC becomes inapplicable, whereas SC is still suitable
for the E.
C. Transmit Antenna Selection Aided SD Pair Scheduling
This subsection proposes a transmit antenna selection aided
source-destination pair scheduling (TAS-SDPS) scheme. In the
TAS-SDPS scheme, the “best” antenna having the maximal
achievable rate of all SD pairs in the set D will be chosen
to access the shared spectrum for the sake of improving the
security of the SNs’s wireless transmissions. Therefore, based
on (7), the SD pair scheduling scheme in the TAS-SDPS can
be formulated as
{s, a} = arg max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
Csmidm , (11)
where s represents the index of the selected pair in the TAS-
SDPS scheme, and a denotes the index of the chosen antenna
of Ss, yielding:
{s, a} = arg max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2. (12)
Therefore, the secrecy capacity of Ss-Ds and Sk-Ds in the
TAS-SDPS scheme can be formulated as CsTAS = Cssads −
Csse and C
k
TAS =
{
Cssads − C
(k,m)
se if Cskss > Ro
Cskss − Cske otherwise
,
respectively.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present our performance analysis for the
Non-coop, RSDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes for transmission
between SD pair over Rayleigh fading channels, whilst for
transmission between SNs over Rician fading channels. The
SOP expressions of the Non-coop scheduling as well as of the
RSDPS and TAS-SDPS scheduling are derived.
A. Conventional Non-coop Scheme
For comparison, the traditional non-cooperative (Non-coop)
transmission scheme is also presented, wherein each SN com-
municates with its DN independently. As above mentioned,
each SN respectively occupies the BHz channel bandwidth.
Thus, different from (7) and (9), the instantaneous channel
capacities of SN-DN and SN-E links are Blog2(1 + γsmdm)
and Blog2(1 + γsme), respectively. The predefined secrecy
rate of each SD pair is Rs. Hence, from (7) and (9), the SOP
of the Non-coop scheme is expressed as
PNonso =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pr(Blog2(1+γsmdm)−Blog2(1+γsme)<Rs)
=
1
M
M∑
m=1
Pr

NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2RsB NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2+∆′0

 , (13)
where ∆
′
0 = (2
Rs
B − 1)NTN0/Pt, and according to (A.6),
PNonso can be obtained as
PNonso =
1
M
M∑
m=1

1−NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
(p+NTNE − 1)!
p! (l − p)! (NTNE−1)!
(
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)l
(
1
σ2me
)NTNE(∆′0
2
2Rs
B
)l−p(
1
σ2me
+
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)−p−NTNE
e
−
∆
′
0
σ2
md

 .(14)
Observe from (13) and (14) that the conventional Non-coop
scheme does not consider the cooperation between the SD
pairs. Furthermore, it does not take the channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of the SNs-DNs links into account. Although
the Non-coop scheme is of lower complexity, it may degrade
the PLS of the wireless transmission. Hence, this motivates
us to conceive more advanced scheme for achieving SOP
improvements.
B. Conventional RSDPS Scheme
This subsection provides the SOP analysis of the traditional
RSDPS scheme used as a benchmarking scheme. In the
conventional RSDPS scheme, each SD pair in the set D will
be chosen to transmit with an equal probability. Therefore,
according to the definition of SOP [8], we can obtain the SOP
of the signal arriving from Sm and Sk in the first as well as
second stage for the RSDPS scheme relying on the Sm-Dm
pair formulated as
P RSDPSso m m = Pr (Csmdm − Csme < Rs) (15)
and
P RSDPSso k m = Pr
(
Csmdm − C
(k,m)
se < Rs, Csksm > Ro
)
+Pr (Csksm − Cske < Rs, Csksm < Ro) , (16)
respectively. Upon combining (7), (9) and (10), we arrive at
P RSDPSso m m=Pr

NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2+∆0


(17)
and
P RSDPSso k m =Pr
(
|hsksm |
2
<2
2·Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
+Θ1, |hsksm |
2
<Θ0
)
+Pr

NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<max
(
2
2Rs
B
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2,
2
2Rs
B
∆1
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
)
+∆0
)
Pr
(
|hsksm |
2>Θ0
)
, (18)
5respectively, where we have ∆0 = (2
2·Rs
B − 1)NTN0/Pt,
∆1 = Pt/(PsNT ), Θ0 = (2
2·Ro
B − 1)/γs, Θ1 =
(2
2·Rs
B − 1)/γs, and Ro is the data rate of a pair of SNs
links. Furthermore, performing SD pair selection in the RS-
DPS scheme is independent of the random variables (RVs)
|hsmidmj |
2 and |hsmiel |
2. For simplicity, given the SD trans-
mission pair m, we assume that the fading coefficients
|hsmidmj |
2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NT }, j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NR},
of all main channels are independent and identically dis-
tributed (i.i.d.) RVs with the same mean, denoted by σ2md =
E(|hsmidmj |
2
). Moreover, we also assume that the fad-
ing coefficients |hsmiel |
2 for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , NT }, l ∈
{1, 2, · · · , NE} , of all wiretap links are i.i.d RVs having the
same average channel gain denoted by σ2me = E(|hsmiel |
2
),
which is a common assumption widely used in the coopera-
tive communication literature. Hence, according to (A.6) and
(A.10), (17) and (18) can be obtained as
P RSDPSso m m=1−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
(p+NTNE − 1)!
p! (l−p)! (NTNE−1)!
(
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)l(
1
σ2me
)NTNE
(
∆0
2
2Rs
B
)l−p(
1
σ2me
+
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)−p−NTNE
e
−
∆0
σ2
md (19)
and
P RSDPSso k m =P¯o km
(
NTNE−1∑
t=0
(
1
σ2ke
)NE( 1
σ2me∆1
)t
(t+NE−1)!
t! (NE−1)!
c−t−NEkm
−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
p+NTNE−1∑
t=0
alpcmd
(
ckm+
2
2Rs
B
∆1σ2md
)−t−NE
+
NE−1∑
t=0
(
1
σ2me
)NTNE(∆1
σ2ke
)t
(t+NTNE−1)!
t! (NTNE−1)!
d−t−NTNEkm
−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
alpdkd
(
dkm+
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)−t−NTNE+Pso km, (20)
respectively, where P¯o km and Pso km are given by (A.8) and
(A.9), respectively. Hence, the SOP of all SD pairs investigated
relying on Sm can be defined as
P RSDPSso m =
1
M

 ∑
k∈D−{m}
P RSDPSso k m + P
RSDPS
so m m

 . (21)
As mentioned above, in the RSDPS scheme, each SD pair
has an equal probability to be chosen. Furthermore, using the
law of total probability [32], we can obtain the SOP for the
RSDPS scheme as
P RSDPSso =
1
M
M∑
m=1
P RSDPSso m . (22)
It is observed from (15) and (16) that although the RSDPS
scheme considers the cooperation between the set of SNs, it
is still independent of the CSIs of the SNs-DNs links, which
implies that the employment of the TAS-SDPS scheme can
further enhance the SOP of the wireless transmission in the
wireless systems investigated.
C. Proposed TAS-SDPS Scheme
In this subsection, we present the SOP analysis of the TAS-
SDPS scheme. As shown in (11), let s denote the index of the
chosen antenna of an SD pair under the TAS-SDPS scheme.
Thus, we can formulate the SOP of the signal impinging from
Ss and Sk under the TAS-SDPS scheme with the aid of the
Ss-Ds pair as
P TASso s = Pr
(
Cssads − Cssae < Rs
)
(23)
and
P TASso k = Pr
(
Cssads − C
(k,s)
se < Rs, Cskss > Ro
)
+Pr (Cskss − Cske < Rs, Cskss < Ro) , (24)
respectively.
Using (8)-(10), both (23) and (24) can be rewritten as
P TASso s = Pr

NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hssadsj
∣∣∣2 < 2 2RsB NE∑
l=1
∣∣hssael∣∣2 + Λ0


(25)
and
P TASso k=Pr
(
|hskss |
2<2
2·Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2+Θ1, |hskss |
2<Θ0
)
+Pr

NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hssadsj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max
(
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hssael ∣∣2,
1
Λ1
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
+Λ0
))
Pr
(
|hskss |
2
>Θ0
)
,(26)
respectively, where we have Λ0 = (2
2·Rs
B − 1)N0/Pt, and
Λ1 = Pt/Ps. Based on (12), we arrive at:
P TASso s=Pr

 max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2+Λ0


(27)
and
P TASso k=Pr
(
|hsksm |
2
<2
2·Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
+Θ1, |hsksm |
2
<Θ0
)
+Pr

 max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max
(
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2,
1
Λ1
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
+Λ0
))
Pr
(
|hskss |
2
>Θ0
)
, (28)
respectively.
Finally, using (A.20) and (A.21), both (27) and (28) can be
obtained as
P TASso s =
∑
S′
β2∑
p=0
Ψ0 (p+NE − 1)!
(
1
σ2me
+ β32
2Rs
B
)−p−NE
(29)
6and
P TASso k= P¯o km

∑
S
β2∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
aβpcβd
(
d
′
km
Λ1
+
β32
2Rs
B
Λ1
)−t−NE
+
∑
S
β2∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
aβpdβd
(
c
′
kmΛ1+β32
2Rs
B
)−t−NE)
+Pso km,(30)
respectively. Moreover, relying on the definition in (21), the
SOP of the investigated system relying on the proposed TAS-
SDPS scheme can be expressed as:
P TASso =
1
M

 ∑
k∈D−{s}
P TASso k + P
TAS
so s

 . (31)
So far, we have derived closed-form SOP expressions of
the conventional Non-coop and RSDPS schemes as well as
the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme.
IV. SECRECY DIVERSITY GAIN ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the secrecy diversity analysis of
the RSDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes in the high MER region
for the sake of providing further insights from (17), (18), (25)
and (26) conceiving both the conventional RSDPS as well as
the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme.
A. Traditional RSDPS Scheme
This subsection analyzes the asymptotic SOP of the con-
ventional RSDPS scheme. In the spirit of [27], the traditional
diversity gain is defined in [31] as
d = − lim
SNR→∞
logPe (SNR)
log SNR
, (32)
which is used for characterizing the reliability of wireless
communications, where SNR and Pe(SNR) denote the signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) of the destination node and the bit error
ratio (BER), respectively. However, we can observe that the
SOPs of the RSDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes are independent
of the SNR, hence the definition of the traditional diversity
gain may not perfectly suit our SOP analysis. Moreover, as
shown in (17), (18), (25) and (26), the SOP of the RSDPS
scheme is related to the main channel |hsmidmj|
2 as well
as to the eavesdropping channels |hsmiel|
2 and |hskel |
2. For
notational convenience, let λse = σ
2
md/σ
2
me denote MER. In
spirit of the above observation, and following [8] and [25],
we define the secrecy diversity gain as the asymptotic ratio
of the logarithmic SOP to the logarithmic λse as λse →∞,
which is mathematically formulated as
d = − lim
λse→∞
log (Pso)
log (λse)
. (33)
Meanwhile, in (33), the SOP Pso behaves as λ
−d
se in the high
MER region, which means that upon increasing the diversity
gain d, Pso decreases faster in the high MER region. Using
(33), the secrecy diversity gain of the RSDPS scheme can be
expressed as
dRSDPS = − lim
λse→∞
log
(
P RSDPSso
)
log (λse)
. (34)
Theorem 1: The secrecy diversity gain of the RSDPS
scheme is given by
dRSDPS = NTNR. (35)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Remark 1: We can observe from Theorem 1 that the RSDPS
scheme only attains a secrecy diversity gain of NTNR, and
the SOP of the RSDPS scheme is governed by the factor
( 1
λse
)NTNR in the high-MER region. This is due to the fact
that the secrecy diversity gain of the RSDPS scheme only
depends on the number of antennas involved by a pair of
the transmitters and receivers. Since dRSDPS does not depend
on the number of SD pairs, the RSDPS scheme achieves no
SOP enhancement upon increasing the number of SD pairs,
which is a disadvantage of the RSDPS scheme. Moreover, the
secrecy diversity gain of the Non-coop scheme can be similarly
obtained as NTNR.
B. Proposed TAS-SDPS Scheme
This subsection is focused on the secrecy diversity analysis
of the TAS-SDPS scheme. Similarly to (34), the secrecy
diversity order of the TAS-SDPS scheme can be expressed
as
dTAS = − lim
λse→∞
log
(
P TASso
)
log (λse)
. (36)
Theorem 2: The secrecy diversity gain of the TAS-SDPS
scheme yields to
dTAS = MNTNR. (37)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Remark 2: Interestingly, we can see from Theorem 2 that
the TAS-SDPS scheme achieves the secrecy diversity gain
of MNTNR, which means that the SOP of the TAS-SDPS
scheme is governed by the factor ( 1
λse
)MNTNR in the high-
MER region. The SOP of the TAS-SDPS scheme can be
improved not only by increasing the number of antennas of a
transmitter and receiver pair, but also by increasing the number
of the SD pairs. Therefore, the TAS-SDPS scheme advocated
significantly outperforms the conventional RSDPS and Non-
coop scheme in terms of their SOPs.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present our performance comparisons
among the Non-coop, the RSDPS, the proposed TAS-SDPS
schemes in terms of their SOPs and secrecy diversity gains.
Specifically, the analytic SOPs of the Non-coop, the RSDPS,
and TAS-SDPS schemes are evaluated by plotting (14), (22)
and (31), respectively. Moreover, the lower bound SOPs of
the RSDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes are obtained by using
(B.15), and (B.24), respectively. The upper bound SOP of the
RSDPS and TAS-SDPS schemes are obtained by using (B.18),
and (B.27), respectively. The simulated SOP of the RSDPS as
well as the proposed the TAS-SDPS schemes are also provided
for demonstrating the correctness of the theoretical results. In
our numerical evaluation, we assume that αsmiel = αskel =
αsmidmj
= 1.
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Fig. 2. SOP vs MER λse of the traditional Non-coop and RSDPS as well as
the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes for different (NT , NR, NE) with M = 4.
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Fig. 3. SOP vs SNR Pt
N0
of the traditional Non-coop and RSDPS as well as
the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes for different MER with NT = NR = NE
= 2, and M = 8.
In Fig. 2, we show the SOP versus MER λse of both
the traditional Non-coop and of the RSDPS as well as of
the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes for different parameters
(NT , NR, NE) by plotting (15), (22) and (31), as a function
of the MER λse. It is shown in Fig. 2 that the SOPs of the
RSDPS, of the Non-coop, and of the TAS-SDPS schemes
decrease, as the number of antennas (NT , NR, NE) increases
from (NT , NR, NE) = (1, 1, 1) to (2, 2, 2). Furthermore, the
RSDPS, the Non-coop, and the TAS-SDPS schemes using
(NT , NR, NE) = (2, 2, 2) achieve better secrecy performance
than that of (NT , NR, NE) = (1, 1, 1), respectively. Fig. 2 also
demonstrates that increasing the MER upgrades the security
of wireless transmissions in networks. Additionally, Fig. 2
demonstrates that the TAS-SDPS scheme attains the best SOP
performance among the traditional RSDPS and Non-coop as
well as the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes, when the MER
increases from -10dB to 15dB.
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Fig. 4. SOP vs the number of source-destination pairs M of the traditional
Non-coop and RSDPS as well as the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes for
different NE with NT = NR = 2, and λse = 10dB.
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Fig. 5. Asymptotic and exact results on the SOP of the traditional RSDPS
as well as the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes with NT = NR = NE = 2, and
M = 4.
Fig. 3 illustrates the SOP versus the SNR Pt
N0
of the
traditional RSDPS and of Non-coop as well as of the proposed
TAS-SDPS schemes. Fig. 3 shows that increasing the SNR
Pt
N0
may moderately degrade the SOPs of the RSDPS, of the
Non-coop as well as of the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes in
the MER = 0dB case. By contrast, upon increasing the SNR,
the SOPs of all schemes decreases are significantly reduced in
the MER = 8dB case. This can be explained by observing that
increasing the SNR is beneficial both for the SNs-DNs links
and for the SNs-E links in the MER = 0dB case. However,
increasing the SNR may be more beneficial for the SNs-
DNs links than for the SNs-E links in the MER = 8dB case.
Furthermore, it can also be seen from Fig. 3 that the SOP
of the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme is lower than that of the
RSDPS and Non-coop schemes at a specific SNR. In contrast
to the Non-coop and RSDPS schemes, this means that the
8security performance benefits from exploiting the cooperation
between the SD pairs by guarding against eavesdropping with
the aid of proposed TAS-SDPS scheme.
Fig. 4 shows our SOP comparison of the traditional RSDPS
and Non-coop as well as of the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes
for different number of the SD pairs M . Observe from Fig. 4
that as the number of SD pairs increases fromM = 2 to 20, the
SOP of the TAS-SDPS scheme is reduced significantly, which
shows that increasing the number of SD pairs is beneficial for
the PLS of the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme, both in the cases
of Ne = 1 and Ne = 4. This is due to the fact that when M
increases from M = 2 to 20, the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme
can take advantage of the cooperation between different SD
pairs for enhancing the PLS of wireless networks. However,
the SOPs of the RSDPS and of the Non-coop schemes remain
unchanged, when the number of SD pairs increases from M
= 2 to 20. Moreover, upon an increasing Ne, the SOP of the
TAS-SDPS scheme can be updated by increasing the number
SD pairs M . As shown in Fig. 4, the proposed TAS-SDPS
scheme outperforms the Non-coop and RSDPS schemes in
terms of their SOPs for all the M values.
Fig. 5 shows both the asymptotic and the exact results
conceiving the SOP of the traditional RSDPS as well as of
the proposed TAS-SDPS schemes, where the lower bound
results, exact results and the upper bound results are obtained
by plotting (B.15), (B.24), (22), (31), (B.18), and (B.27) as
a function of the MER, respectively. Observe from Fig. 5
that the exact SOP curves of the RSDPS, and the TAS-SDPS
schemes are more and more close to their corresponding lower
and upper bounds, as the MER increases. Moreover, as shown
in Fig. 5, in the high-MER region, the exact SOP curves of
the RSDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes exhibit the same slopes
of their corresponding lower and upper bounds, respectively.
This demonstrates the correctness of our secrecy diversity gain
analysis of the RSDPS, and TAS-SDPS schemes in the high-
MER region.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we explored a wireless network coexisting
with multiple wireless systems in the face of an eavesdropper,
supporting multiple SD pairs, where each SD pair may access
the shared spectrum dynamically, and the eavesdropper aims
for maliciously wiretapping the signals transmitted by the
user nodes relying on a wide-band receiver. We proposed a
cooperative framework relying on two stages for enhancing the
PLS of the ongoing wireless transmissions, wherein an SD pair
will be chosen as the transmitting pair within a given spectral
band from the perspective of security. Moreover, we presented
an SD pair scheduling scheme, which is termed as the TAS-
SDPS. We analyzed the SOP of the proposed TAS-SDPS
scheme, and carried out the SOP analysis of both the RSDPS
and of the Non-coop schemes as a baseline. We also carried out
the secrecy diversity gain analysis of the TAS-SDPS scheme,
as well as of the RSDPS scheme. It was demonstrated that
the TAS-SDPS scheme outperforms both the RSDPS and the
Non-coop schemes in terms of their SOPs. Furthermore, as
the number of SD pairs increases, the SOP of the TAS-SDPS
scheme improves, while the SOPs of the RSDPS and Non-
coop schemes remain unchanged.
APPENDIX A
Upon defining U =
NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj |
2
, X1 =
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
, X2 =
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
, and X3 = |hsksm |
2
,
and taking into account that the RVs |hsmidmj |
2
, |hskel |
2
,
|hsmiel |
2
, and |hsksm |
2
are independent of each other, P RSDPSso m m
and P RSDPSso k m can be expressed as
P RSDPSso m m=Pr

NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2+∆0


=
∫ ∞
0
FU
(
∆0 + 2
2Rs
B x1
)
fX1 (x1) dx1 (A.1)
and
P RSDPSso k m =Pr

NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<max
(
2
2Rs
B
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2 ,
2
2Rs
B
∆1
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
)
+∆0
)
Pr
(
|hsksm |
2>Θ0
)
+Pr
(
|hsksm|
2<2
2·Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2+Θ1, |hsksm |
2<Θ0
)
= P¯o km
(∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x2
∆1
FU
(
∆0+2
2Rs
B x1
)
fX1(x1)fX2(x2) dx1dx2
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
∆1x1
FU
(
∆0+
2
2Rs
B
∆1
x2
)
fX2(x2)fX1(x1) dx2dx1
)
+Pso km,(A.2)
respectively, where FU (u) is the cumulative distribution func-
tion (CDF) of RV U , fX1(x1) and fX2(x2) are respective the
probability density functions (PDFs) of the RVs X1 and X2,
P¯o km = Pr(|hsksm |
2
> Θ0), and Pso km = Pr(|hsksm |
2
<
2
2·Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
+Θ1, |hsksm |
2
< Θ0). For simplicity, we as-
sume that for different m, i, j, l, k, σ2smidmj
= σ2md, σ
2
smi el
=
σ2me, and σ
2
skel
= σ2me. Based on [9], they can be expressed
as:
FU
(
∆0+2
2Rs
B x1
)
=1−exp
(
−
∆0+2
2Rs
B x1
σ2md
)
NTNR−1∑
l=0
1
l!
(
∆0+2
2Rs
B x1
σ2md
)l
(A.3)
and
fX1 (x1)=
x1
NTNE−1
(NTNE−1)!
(
1
σ2me
)NTNE
exp
(
−
x1
σ2me
)
(A.4)
and
fX2 (x2) =
x2
NE−1
(NE − 1)!
(
1
σ2ke
)NE
exp
(
−
x2
σ2ke
)
, (A.5)
9respectively. Substituting (A.3) and (A.4) into (A.1) yields
P RSDPSso m m =
∫ ∞
0
FU
(
∆0 + 2
2Rs
B x1
)
fX1 (x1) dx1
=1−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
(p+NTNE − 1)!
p! (l − p)! (NTNE−1)!
(
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)l(
1
σ2me
)NTNE
(
∆0
2
2Rs
B
)l−p(
1
σ2me
+
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)−p−NTNE
e
−
∆0
σ2
md . (A.6)
Relying on [29], the PDF of RV X3 can be approximated
as
fX3 (x3) =
(
msksm
σ2sksm
)msksm x3mB−1
Γ (msksm)
exp
(
−
msksmx3
σ2sksm
)
,
(A.7)
where msksm =
(1+Ksksm )
2
2Ksksm+1
, and σ2sksm denotes the average
power of |hsksm |
2. Hence, P¯o km and Pso km can be further
formulated as
P¯o km=
∫ ∞
Θ0
(
msksm
σ2sksm
)msksmx3msksm−1
Γ (msksm)
exp
(
−
msksmx3
σ2sksm
)
dx3
=
msksm−1∑
g=0
(Θ0)
g
g!
exp
(
−
Θ0msksm
σ2sksm
)(
msksm
σ2sksm
)g
(A.8)
and
Pso km =


∫ Θ0
0 fX3 (x3)dx3, if Rs ≥ Ro∫ Θ0
0
fX3 (x3)dx3
∫ Θ2
0
fX2 (x2)dx2+
∫ Θ2
0
∫ 2 2RsB x2+Θ1
0
fX2 (x2) fX3 (x3)dx3dx2, otherwise
=


1−
msksm−1∑
g=0
(Θ0)
g
g! exp
(
−
Θ0msksm
σ2sksm
)(
msksm
σ2sksm
)g
, if Rs ≥ Ro(
1−
msksm−1∑
g=0
(Θ0)
g
g! exp
(
−
Θ0msksm
σ2sksm
)(
msksm
σ2sksm
)g)(NE−1∑
g=0
1
g!
(
Θ2
σ2me
exp
(
− Θ2
σ2me
))g)
+Θ3Θ4
(
(NE−1)!
(
1
σ2me
)−NE
−exp
(
− Θ2
σ2me
)
NE−1∑
g=0
(NE−1)!
g! (Θ2)
g
(
1
σ2me
)NE−g)
−
msksm−1∑
g=0
g∑
p=0
(NE−1)!Θ4
p!(g−p)!
(
msksm
σ2sksm
)−msksm+g(2 2RsB −1
γs2
2Rs
B
)g−p
exp

−
(
2
2Rs
B −1
)
msksm
γsσ2sksm




(
2
2Rs
B
)g
(p+NE−1)!(
1
σ2me
+2
2Rs
B
msksm
σ2sksm
)p+NE −
p+NE−1∑
l=0
(p+NE−1)!(Θ2)
l
l!
(
1
σ2me
+2
2Rs
B
msksm
σ2sksm
)p+NE−l
exp
(
−Θ2
(
1
σ2me
+2
2Rs
B
msksm
σ2sksm
)))
, otherwise
,(A.9)
respectively, where Θ2 =
1
2
2Rs
B
(Θ0 − Θ1),
Θ3 =
(msksm−1)!σ
2msksm
sksm
(msksm )
msksm
, and Θ4 =
1
(NE−1)!Γ(msksm )
( 1
σ2me
)
NE
(
msksm
σ2sksm
)msksm . Furthermore,
substituting (A.3)-(A.5), and (A.8)-(A.9) into (A.2) yields
P RSDPSso k m =P¯o km
(
NTNE−1∑
t=0
(
1
σ2ke
)NE( 1
σ2me∆1
)t
(t+NE−1)!
t! (NE−1)!
c−t−NEkm
−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
p+NTNE−1∑
t=0
alpcmd
(
ckm+
2
2Rs
B
∆1σ2md
)−t−NE
+
NE−1∑
t=0
(
1
σ2me
)NTNE(∆1
σ2ke
)t
(t+NTNE−1)!
t! (NTNE−1)!
d−t−NTNEkm
−
NTNR−1∑
l=0
l∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
alpdkd
(
dkm+
2
2Rs
B
σ2md
)−t−NTNE+Pso km, (A.10)
where alp =
( 1
σ2
ke
)NE ( 1
σ2me
)NTNE (2
2Rs
B
σ2
md
)l(
∆0
2
2Rs
B
)l−pe
−
∆0
σ2
md
p!(l−p)!t!(NE−1)!(NTNE−1)!
, cmd=
( 1
σ2me
+2
2Rs
B
σ2
md
)−p−NTNE+t∆1
−t(p+NTNE− 1)!(t+NE− 1)!,
dkd = (
1
σ2
ke
+ 2
2Rs
B
∆1σ2md
)−p−NE+t∆1
t−p(t + NTNE − 1)!(p +
NE − 1)!, ckm =
1
σ2
ke
+ 1∆1σ2me
, and dkm =
∆1
σ2
ke
+ 1
σ2me
.
Moreover, defining Q =
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj |
2
, W1 =
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
, and W2 =
NE∑
l=1
|hskel |
2
, and exploiting that the
RVs Q, W1 and W2 are independent of each other, P
TAS
so s and
P TASso k can be formulated as
P TASso s =Pr

 max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2+Λ0


=
∫ ∞
0
∏
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
FQ
(
Λ0 + 2
2Rs
B w1
)
fW1 (w1) dw1 (A.11)
and
P TASso k=Pr

 max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<max
(
2
2Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2,
2
2Rs
B
Λ1
NE∑
l=1
|hskel|
2
)
+Λ0
)
P¯o km+Pso km
=

∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
w2
Λ1
∏
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
FQ
(
Λ0+2
2Rs
B w1
)
fW1(w1) fW2(w2) dw1dw2
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
Λ1w1
∏
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
FQ
(
Λ0+
2
2Rs
B w2
Λ1
)
fW2 (w2) fW1 (w1)
dw2dw1
)
P¯o km+Pso km, (A.12)
respectively.
Based on [9], FQ(w), fW1(w1) and fW2(w2) can be for-
mulated as:
FQ (w) = 1− exp
(
−
w
σ2md
)NR−1∑
l=0
1
l!
(
w
σ2md
)l
(A.13)
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and
fW1 (w1) =
w1
NE−1
(NE − 1)!
(
1
σ2me
)NE
exp
(
−
w1
σ2me
)
(A.14)
and
fW2 (w2) =
w2
NE−1
(NE − 1)!
(
1
σ2ke
)NE
exp
(
−
w2
σ2ke
)
, (A.15)
respectively. Substituting (A.17) and (A.18) into (A.15) yields
P TASso s =
∫ ∞
0
∏
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
FQ
(
Λ0 + 2
2Rs
B w
)
fW (w) dw
=
∑
S′
β2∑
p=0
∫ ∞
0
Ψ0w
p+NE−1 exp
(
−
w
σ2me
− β32
2Rs
B w
)
dw
=
∑
S′
β2∑
p=0
Ψ0 (p+NE − 1)!
(
1
σ2me
+ β32
2Rs
B
)−p−NE
, (A.16)
where β1=
(|D|·NT )!
NR+1∏
i=1
ni!
NR∏
j=1
(− 1
σ
2(j−1)
md
(j−1)!
)
nj
, β2=
NR∑
j=1
nj(j − 1),
S′ = {(n1, n2, · · ·,nNR+1)|
NR+1∑
i=1
ni= |D|·NT},
β3 =
1
σ2
md
(|D| ·NT − nNR+1), and Ψ0 =
β1
(NE−1)!
(
β2
p
)( 1
σ2me
)NE (2
2Rs
B )β2( Λ0
2
2Rs
B
)β2−pe−β3Λ0 .
Using (A.17)-(A.19), and (A.8)-(A.9), we arrive at
P TASso k=P¯o km

∑
S
β2∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
aβpcβd
(
d
′
km
Λ1
+
β32
2Rs
B
Λ1
)−t−NE
+
∑
S
β2∑
p=0
p+NE−1∑
t=0
aβpdβd
(
c
′
kmΛ1+β32
2Rs
B
)−t−NE)
+Pso km,(A.17)
where aβp =
( 1
σ2
ke
)NE ( 1
σ2me
)NE (2
2Rs
B )p(Λ0)
β2−pβ1(β2)!e
−Λ0β3
p!(β2−p)!t!(NE−1)!(NE−1)!
,
cβd = (
1
σ2me
+ 2
2Rs
B β3)
−p−NE+tΛ1
−t(p + NE − 1)!(t +
NE − 1)!, c
′
km =
1
σ2
ke
+ 1Λ1σ2me
, d
′
km =
Λ1
σ2
ke
+ 1
σ2me
, and dβd =
( 1
σ2
ke
+ 2
2Rs
B β3
Λ1
)−p−NE+tΛ1
t−p(t+NE − 1)!(p+NE − 1)!.
APPENDIX B
A, Proof of Theorem 1:
Upon utilizing (18), (19), and the inequal-
ity
NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj |
2
≤ NTNRmax
i,j
|hsmidmj |
2,
2
2Rs
B
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
+ ∆0 ≥ 2
2Rs
B max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2, and
2
2Rs
B max(
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2, 1∆1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2) + ∆0 ≥
2
2Rs
B max(max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2, 1∆1 maxl
|hskel |
2), we have
P RSDPSso ≥
1
M
M∑
m=1
1
M
(
Pr
(
NTNRmax
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2
)
+
∑
k∈D−{m}
Pr
(
NTNRmax
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max(max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2,
1
∆1
max
l
|hskel |
2
)))
P¯o km. (B.1)
Defining X1=max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2, X2=max
i,l
|hskel |
2, and Y =
max
i,l
|hsmidmj |
2, the expressions Pr(max
i,j
|hsmidmj |
2
< 2
2Rs
B
1
NTNR
max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2) and Pr(max
i,j
|hsmidmj |
2 < 2
2Rs
B
1
NTNR
max(max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2, 1∆1 maxl
|hskel |
2)) can be rewritten as
Pr
(
max
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2 < 2 2RsB
NTNR
max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2
)
=
∫ ∞
0
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
)
fX1 (x1) dx1 (B.2)
and
Pr
(
max
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2< 2 2RsB
NTNR
max
(
max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2, 1∆1 maxl |hskel|2
))
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x2
∆1
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
)
fX1 (x1) fX2 (x2) dx1dx2
+
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
∆1x1
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x2
NTNR∆1
)
fX2 (x2) fX1 (x1) dx2dx1, (B.3)
respectively, where FY (y) is the CDF of the RV Y , while
fX1(x1) and fX2(x2) are the PDFs of the RVs X1 and X2,
respectively.
Noting that the RVs |hsmiel |
2 and |hskel |
2 obey the ex-
ponential distribution and are independent of each other,
i = 1, 2, · · · , NT , l = 1, 2, · · · , NE , the CDF of X1 can be
expressed as:
Pr(X<x)=Pr
(
max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2<x
)
=
∏
i,l
Pr
(∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2 < x
)
= 1 +
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
(−1)|Cn| exp

−∑
i,l∈Cn
x
σ2smi el

, (B.4)
where |Cn| is the cardinality of the set Cn, and Cn denotes
the n-th non-empty subset of C. Moreover, C represents the
set of the links spanning from a SN to the eavesdropper E in
the second stage.
Hence, the PDF of the RV X1 can be formulated as
fX1 (x1) =
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
∑
i,l∈Cn
(−1)
|Cn|+1
σ2smi el
exp

− ∑
i,l∈Cn
x1
σ2smi el

.
(B.5)
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Similarly to (B.5), the PDF of the RV X2 is given by
fX2 (x2) =
2NE−1∑
n=1
∑
l∈Fg
(−1)
|Fg |+1
σ2skel
exp

−∑
l∈Fg
x2
σ2skel

, (B.6)
where |Fg| represents the cardinality of the set Fg , and Fg is
the g-th non-empty subset of F . Moreover, F denotes the set
of the links spanning from a SN to the eavesdropper E in the
first stage. Furthermore,
∏
i,j
FY (
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
) can be expanded as
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
)
=
∏
i,j
(
1−exp
(
−
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
x1
σ2smidmj
))
.
(B.7)
For notational convenience, we introduce Z1 =
− 2
2Rs
B
NTNR
x1
σ2
smi
dmj
, and Z2 = −
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
x2
∆1σ2smidmj
. Then,
E(Z1) is given by
E (Z1)=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x2
∆1
(
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
x1
σ2smidmj
)
fX1 (x1) fX2 (x2) dx1dx2
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
1∑
t=0
(
1
∆1
)t
2
2Rs
B angt(−1)
|Cn|+|Fg |
NTNR (1− t)!
1
λse
, (B.8)
where angt =
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)t−1(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)(−
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
−
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)−t−1
α
smi
dmj
.
Upon considering λse → ∞, E(Z1) tends to zero. Similarly,
E(Z2), E((Z1)
2) and E((Z2)
2) also tend to zero, when
λse → ∞. Thus, based on [25], 1 − exp(−
1
NTNR
2
2Rs
B x
σ2
smi
dmj
)
can be simplified to
1− exp
(
−
1
NTNR
2
2Rs
B x
σ2smidmj
)
1
=
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
x
σ2smidmj
. (B.9)
Hence,
∏
i,j
FY (
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
) and
∏
i,j
FY (
2
2Rs
B x2
∆1NTNR
) can be rewrit-
ten as
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x1
NTNR
)
=
(
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)NTNR∏
i,j
1
σ2smidmj
xNTNR
(B.10)
and
∏
i,j
FY
(
2
2Rs
B x1
∆1NTNR
)
=
(
2
2Rs
B
∆1NTNR
)NTNR∏
i,j
1
σ2smidmj
xNTNR ,
(B.11)
respectively.
Substituting (B.4) and (B.9) into (B.1) yields
Pr
(
NTNRmax
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2 < 2 2RsB max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2
)
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
(
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)NTNR
(NTNR)!(−1)
|Cn|+1

∑
i,l∈Cn
1
σ2siel


−NTNR∏
i,j
1
σ2smidmj
,(B.12)
which can be further rewritten as
Pr
(
NTNRmax
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2 < 2 2RsB max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2
)
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
(−1)
|Cn|+1ωil0
(
1
λse
)NTNR
, (B.13)
where ωil0=(NTNR)!(
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)
NTNR
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi el
)
−NTNR
(
∏
i,j
αsmidmj
)−1.
Similarly to (B.12), (B.2) can be finally obtained as
Pr
(
max
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2< 2 2RsB
NTNR
max
(
max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2, 1∆1maxl |hskel|2
))
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|αil0
(
1
λse
)NTNR
+
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|βil0
(
1
λse
)NTNR
, (B.14)
where αil0 =
(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)(NTNR)!
∏
i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)NTNR
(NTNR−t)!(∆1)
t(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)NTNR−k(α
′
il0)
t+1
,
βil0 =
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)(NTNR)!
∏
i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NTNR∆1
)NTNR
(NTNR−t)!(∆1)
−t(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)NTNR−k(∆1α
′
il0)
t+1
, and
α
′
il0=
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
∆1αsmiel
+
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
.
Based on (B.13) and (B.14), (B.1) can be reformulated as
(B.15) shown at the top of the following page.
Combining (34) and (B.15) yields
dRSDPS ≤ NTNR. (B.16)
Furthermore, in the high-SNR region we can ob-
serve from the definition of ∆0 that as the transmit
power Pt tends to infinity, ∆0 approaches zero. Substi-
tuting the inequality
NT∑
i=1
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj |
2
≥ max
i,j
|hsmidmj |
2,
2
2Rs
B
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2 + ∆0 ≤ 2
2Rs
B NTNEmax
i,l
|hsmiel |
2,
and 2
2Rs
B max(
NT∑
i=1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2, 1∆1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2) + ∆0 ≤
2
2Rs
B max(NTNE max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2, NE∆1 maxl
|hskel |
2) into (18)
and (19) yields
P RSDPSso ≤
1
M
M∑
m=1
1
M
(
Pr
(
max
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NTNE max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2
)
+
∑
k∈D−{m}
Pr
(
max
i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max(NTNEmax
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2,
NE
∆1
max
l
|hskel|
2
)))
P¯o km. (B.17)
Similarly to (B.15), (B.17) can be reformulated as (B.18)
shown at the top of the following page, where ωil1 =
(NTNR)!(2
2Rs
B NTNE)
NTNR
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmiel
)
−NTNR
(
∏
i,j
αsmidmj
)−1,
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P
RSDPS
so ≥
1
M
M∑
m=1

1
M

2
NTNE−1∑
n=1
(−1)|Cn|+1ωil0+
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmαil0 +
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmβil0



( 1
λse
)NTNR
. (B.15)
P
RSDPS
so ≤
1
M
M∑
m=1

1
M

2
NTNE−1∑
n=1
(−1)
|Cn|+1ωil1+
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)
|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmαil1 +
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
NTNR∑
t=0
(−1)
|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmβil1



( 1
λse
)NTNR
. (B.18)
αil1 =
(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)
∏
i,j
1
(NTNR)!αsmidmj
(2
2Rs
B NTNE)
NTNR
(NTNR−t)!(NT∆1)
t(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)NTNR−k(α
′
il1)
t+1
,
α
′
il1 =
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
NT∆1αsmi el
+
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
, and βil1 =
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
(NTNR)!αsmiel
)
∏
i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
(
2
2Rs
B NE
∆1
)NTNR
(NTNR−t)!(∆1NT)
−t(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)NTNR−k(∆1NTα
′
il1)
t+1
.
Moreover, substituting (B.18) into (34) yields
dRSDPS ≥ NTNR. (B.19)
Therefore, based on (B.16) and (B.19), the secrecy diversity
gain of the conventional RSDPS scheme can be expressed as
dRSDPS = NTNR. (B.20)
B, Proof of Theorem 2:
Considering the inequality
2
2Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
+ Λ0 ≥ 2
2Rs
B max
l
|hsmiel |
2,
max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj|
2
≤NRmax
m,i,j
|hsmidmj|
2, and
2
2Rs
B max(
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
, 1Λ1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
) + Λ0 ≥
2
2Rs
B max(max
l
|hsmiel |
2, 1Λ1 maxl
|hskel |
2), we arrive at
P TASso ≥
1
M
(
Pr
(
NRmax
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2< 2 2RsB max
l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2
)
+
∑
k∈D−{m}
Pr
(
NRmax
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB max(max
l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2 ,
1
Λ1
max
l
|hskel |
2
)))
P¯o km. (B.21)
Similarly to (B.12) and (B.14), Pr(NTNRmax
m,i,j
|hsmidmj |
2
< 2
2Rs
B max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2
) and Pr(NTNRmax
m,i,j
|hsmidmj |
2
< 2
2Rs
B
max(max
i,l
|hsmiel |
2
, 1∆1 maxl
|hskel |
2
)) can be rewritten as
Pr
(
max
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2< 1
NTNR
(
2
2Rs
B max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2
))
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
(−1)|Cn|+1ωmil0
(
1
λse
)MNTNR
(B.22)
and
Pr
(
max
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2 < 1
NTNR
2
2Rs
B
max
(
max
i,l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2, 1∆1 maxl |hskel |2
))
=
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|αmil0
(
1
λse
)MNTNR
+
2NTNE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|βmil0
(
1
λse
)MNTNR
, (B.23)
respectively, where αmil0 =
(MNTNR)!(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(∆1)t(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)MNTNR−t(α
′
il0)
t+1
, ωmil0 =
(MNTNR)!(
2
2Rs
B
NTNR
)
MNTNR
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsiel
)
−MNTNR
(
∏
m,i,j
αsmidmj
)−1,
and βmil0=
(MNTNR)!(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NTNR∆1
)MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(∆1)−t(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)MNTNR−t(∆1α
′
il0)
t+1
.
With the aid of (B.22) and (B.23), we arrive at (B.24)
shown at the top of the following page, where ωmil2 =
(MNTNR)!(
2
2Rs
B
NR
)
MNTNR
(
∑
i,l∈Cn
1
αsiel
)
−MNTNR
(
∏
i,j
αsmidmj
)−1,
αmil2 =
(MNTNR)!(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NR
)MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(Λ1)t(
∑
l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)MNTNR−t(α
′
il2)
t+1
,
α
′
il2 =
∑
l∈Cn
1
Λ1αsmiel
+
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
, and βmil2 =
(MNTNR)!(
∑
l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
( 2
2Rs
B
NRΛ1
)MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(Λ1)−t(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)MNTNR−t(Λ1α
′
il2)
t+1
. Substituting
(B.24) into (36) yields
dTAS ≤MNTNR. (B.25)
Furthermore, upon considering an infinite SNR and us-
ing the inequality max
m∈D,1≤i≤NT
NR∑
j=1
|hsmidmj|
2
≥max
m,i,j
|hsmidmj |
2,
2
2Rs
B
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2
+ Λ0 ≤ 2
2Rs
B NEmax
l
|hsmiel |
2, and
2
2Rs
B max(
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2, 1Λ1
NE∑
l=1
|hsmiel |
2) + Λ0 ≤ 2
2Rs
B
13
P
TAS
so ≥
1
M

2
NE−1∑
n=1
(−1)|Cn|+1ωmil2+
2NE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmαmil2 +
2NE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmβmil2

( 1
λse
)MNTNR
. (B.24)
P
TAS
so ≤
1
M

2
NE−1∑
n=1
(−1)
|Cn|+1ωmil3+
2NE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)
|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmαmil3 +
2NE−1∑
n=1
2NE−1∑
g=1
MNTNR∑
t=0
(−1)
|Cn|+|Fg|P¯o kmβmil3

( 1
λse
)MNTNR
. (B.27)
max(NEmax
l
|hsmiel |
2, NEΛ1 maxl
|hskel |
2), we have
P TASso ≤
1
M
(
Pr
(
max
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NE max
l
∣∣hsmiel∣∣2
)
+
∑
k∈D−{m}
Pr
(
max
m,i,j
∣∣∣hsmidmj
∣∣∣2<2 2RsB NEmax
(
max
l
∣∣hsmiel ∣∣2,
1
Λ1
max
l
|hskel |
2
)))
P¯o km. (B.26)
Similarly to (B.21), (B.26) can be expanded as (B.27)
shown at the top of the following page, where αmil3 =
(MNTNR)!(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
(2
2Rs
B NE)
MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(Λ1)t(
∑
l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)MNTNR−t(α
′
il2)
t+1
, ωmil3 =
(MNTNR)!(2
2Rs
B NE)
MNTNR
(
∑
l∈Cn
1
αsmiel
)
−MNTNR
(
∏
m,i,j
αsmidmj
)−1
and βmil3 =
(MNTNR)!(
∑
l∈Cn
1
αsmi
el
)
∏
m,i,j
1
α
smi
dmj
(
2
2Rs
B NE
Λ1
)MNTNR
(MNTNR−t)!(Λ1)−t(
∑
l∈Fg
1
αskel
)MNTNR−t(Λ1α
′
il2)
t+1
.
Hence, upon using (36) and (B.27), we obtain
dTAS ≥MNTNR. (B.28)
By combining (B.25) and (B.28), we arrive at the secrecy
diversity gain of the proposed TAS-SDPS scheme as
dTAS = MNTNR. (B.29)
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